

his influence upon the destiny of Germany even beyond his death, all the more so, as numerous other factors all point in that same direction. Historical evolution, as well as the psychological make-up of the German people, incline them towards the acceptance of totalitarian, rather than democratic principles; temporary achievements of the national-socialist regime and the enormous territorial extension of "Greater Germany" at the highest point of German military successes, at the end of the year 1941, will for a long time be kept alive as a "glorious" memory with the German youth and together with the cult of Hitler and his "martyr death", may serve as a potentially lasting inspiration for the nationalistic goals ~~for~~ of future German generations.

Apart from the certain fact that parts of the national-socialist party, its leader elements and elite groups (such as the SS corps), will attempt to go ~~to~~ underground at the moment of German defeat-- and may already be doing so at this very moment--, one must therefore prepare against the distinct possibility that time and again political groups will emerge in Germany, which will try to salvage out of Germany's military collapse remnants of the national-socialist ideology and will endeavour to revive nationalistic aspirations and ambitions in the German youth.

It will be imperative to the interests of the Allies to combat and frustrate any such attempts or tendencies, not only in Germany, but wherever else they may show in Europe. The task of political reeducation and conversion, with which the Allies will be confronted, if they are to be able to orientate European politics towards democratic principles of statesmanship, and most of all, if the Allies are to eliminate with finality the dangers of aggression and power politics inherent in any Germany endowed with a nationalistic unity and regime, will otherwise have become well-nigh impossible.

Difficulties of political reeducation

There can be no doubt that this task of political reeducation, at best, will be an extremely difficult one, since it proposes no less than to supplant a firmly established value system, e.g. National - Socialism, which, although led ad absurdum by ~~reality~~ reality, that is the military facts, is still strongly entrenched behind well-accepted symbols of a "mythical" character (Blut und Boden - Blood and Soil; Rasse und Volk - Race and Folk), by a new value system, the democratic ideology, which as yet has not found symbols of equal strength, or the symbols of which, at least, have not as yet gained equal acceptance and strength of faith.

Aside from these theoretical obstacles, numerous practical difficulties will be encountered in this endeavour, among which the lack of suitable educators will, at the beginning, be felt as the main stumbling block, for while hardly any persons, acceptable for reeducating German youth, will be found inside Germany, since the teacher body, quite especially, was among the first and most fervent groups adhering to Hitler and national-socialist principles, émigré elements, although they may be ideologically well equipped for such a task, will on the other hand not be acceptable in the eyes of the German people, and particularly German youth, since they would by necessity be regarded by them as foreign, that is "enemy" inspired elements, opposed to German interests, and therefore liable to arouse rather antagonism, than sympathy to any principles advanced by the Allies.

Safeguarding of American interests through political control and the shaping of public opinion.

In the face of all these difficulties, it may well be that the United States will prefer, instead of attempting to forcibly remold the ideological concept of the German (or other European) people

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immediately after the cessation of hostilities, to let this ideological conversion be accomplished in the course of normal political and historical evolution, limiting their efforts to orientate this evolution into appropriate channels by suppressing any potential political developments which could lead to a politics of aggression or totalitarianism in Germany, or, for that matter, in Europe generally, running contrary to the interests of the United States, while encouraging and furthering those political developments in harmony with the United States and Allied policies.

The task at hand will therefor be simplified and reduced from one of political reeducation, to one of political control and the shaping of public opinion.

However, and since the developments in modern international politics best exemplified by the rise of National-Socialism itself, have demonstrated conclusively that it is not any longer sufficient to exert a corrective control after the fact accomplished, that is a therapeutic control, but that in order to forestall dangerous and undesirable political developments and tendencies a preventive control is even more necessary, it will be essential to establish beyond the official agencies of control and representation entrusted with the safeguarding of United States interests, AN AGENCY NOT OFFICIALLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OR UNITED STATES INTERESTS, WHICH SHALL BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE AND INTERFERE WITH GERMAN AND EUROPEAN POLITICS THROUGH SUBVERSIVE METHODS, OR METHODS DESCRIBED AS "BLACK", that is methods and operations which purport and seem to originate with German, or other European parties, groups or persons.

Confused

It would seem that the MO Branch of OSS should be particularly well equipped to perform such a task, because of the background and abilities of some of its personnel, the training which this personnel received and the experience this agency gained during the war.

... of an MO agency in post-war Europe

The political set-up which will be encountered in Germany, and in Europe generally, after the cessation of hostilities, will provide ample possibilities for such an agency to organize activities as those outlined: the disappearance of the leading political cliques, the collapse of the economic and political structure, and foremost, the desintegration of all values and standards hitherto proclaimed and enforced, will all tend to create a state of complete political chaos, culminating in an anarchic reassertion of the individual, which will express itself in manifestations of "popular" justice and in the formation of innumerable action committees, representative interest groups and political parties, many of which conflicting with each other (as was f.i. shown in Italy).

Danger of communistic totalitarian tendencies

✓ This unstable political climate will prove to be most propitious to the growth of communistic principles and large groups, especially of the German people, will find themselves drawn into the communistic orbit, because of the loss of all personal property and of the very means of existence through bombardments or other military means of destruction, the at least temporary cessation of all organized economical and industrial life, the probable devaluation of the currency, and most of all, the absence of any ethical and social norms regulating the life of the individual. It may be safely assumed that in addition to all these elements disrupting the established social and political order, the planned political influence of the Soviet Union will certainly strive to gain a place of preponderance in German and European political affairs, so that the communistic block may be expected to emerge strongest among the "splinter" parties, which the disappearance of National-Socialism will bring into existence.

✓ On the other hand, it seems certain that the strongly totalitarian principles underlying every communistic governmental structure,

by their very resemblance to the basic economic and social notions on which National-Socialism was founded, will run contrary to the policies of the United States, so that one of the tasks of the proposed agency will consist of counteracting, or at least attenuating such communistic totalitarian tendencies.

Objective of MO activities in Germany

More generally, it may be said, as a tentative formulation of the main objective in Germany of this agency, that its activities shall be directed towards preventing the formation of a new German political unity, as long as the whole German people have not matured to perform with the concepts of democratic principles.

For as long as a nationalistic Germany, or a Germany with potential nationalistic tendencies, is politically united, she remains also a potential threat to the interests and policies of the United States and presents an insurmountable obstacle to the pacification of Europe, whereas a Germany, politically divided within herself, can easily be directed and influenced, so that the German people themselves may gradually accept and evolve towards^{a)} democratic ideology.

(The unbeaten Roman legions were vanquished in the battle of the Teutoburger Forest by a Germany, which for the first time in history, had found a political unity, but once more Germany weakened and fell into subservience, when, a few years later, the Germanic chieftains killed their leader Arminius and began to fight anew against each other)

The often advocated repartition of Germany into the principalities, which formed Germany from the 17th to the 19th Century, today, in a highly secularized and industrially condensed world, has become a political impossibility, but the same effect as that aimed at by this proposition, namely that of splitting up the German nation and thus blunting its nationalistic will, can be achieved by maintaining a state of political discord through methods of political subversion as those outlined here.

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Methods of combatting communistic or other
 radical political movements and tendencies
 Operational possibilities in Germany

In the particular case of communistic tendencies gaining preponderant control in post-war Germany, at least the more radical aspects of which it may be deemed desirable to countervail, the role to be played by the agency will mostly be a compensating one.

Large groups will be found within the German population, which are and will be traditionally averse to any communistic form of government, such as the deeply catholic groups in southern and western Germany, the rural population in general, the owners of factories or real estate among the bourgeoisie, and others, which compensating forces can readily be brought to play through various means of political propaganda.

(Here is not the space to elaborate on those means of propaganda, but it may be recorded that all radical political movements can effectively be fought and counteracted by overemphasizing and exaggerating their radical character. Thus, f.i. during the French Revolution, Robespierre himself was compelled to oppose publicly and denounce some of the more extreme and ludicrous forms of Jacobinism, such as the cult of the "Supreme Being", the abolition of the traditional symbols.--kings and queens-- on playing cards, etc., as propagated by inimical aristocratic circles in an effort to ridicule Jacobinism.)

Similar tactics can naturally be employed whenever some other political party in Germany may show signs of assuming too autocratic a power and a too strongly totalitarian pangermanistic tendency. The directives determining the counter-measures to be taken by the proposed agency should in this respect parallel the politics of Cardinal Richelieu, who was intent on preserving the European balance of power by playing upon and by encouraging the secular "querelles allemandes", that is the predilection of the Germans for political sectarianism, party dissension and rhetorical political discussions. The possibilities which these traits, intrinsic to the German character, offer for obtaining a hold on, and influencing German politics, are as obvious, as they are numerous :